Is Legal Scholarship Worth Its Cost? by Campos, Paul
University of Colorado Law School 
Colorado Law Scholarly Commons 
Articles Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship 
2017 
Is Legal Scholarship Worth Its Cost? 
Paul Campos 
University of Colorado Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles 
 Part of the Jurisprudence Commons, Legal Biography Commons, Legal Education Commons, and the 
Legal Writing and Research Commons 
Citation Information 
Paul Campos, Is Legal Scholarship Worth Its Cost?, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 377 (2017), available at 
https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/516. 
Copyright Statement 
Copyright protected. Use of materials from this collection beyond the exceptions provided for in the Fair Use and 
Educational Use clauses of the U.S. Copyright Law may violate federal law. Permission to publish or reproduce is 
required. 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship at Colorado Law 
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Colorado Law 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact jane.thompson@colorado.edu. 
13. 88.2 CAMPOS_FINAL (REVISED) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/22/2017 8:11 PM 
 
  IS LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP WORTH ITS 
COST? 
PAUL CAMPOS* 
It is almost impossible to mention books in bulk without 
grossly overpraising the great majority of them. Until 
one has some kind of professional relationship with books 
one does not discover how bad the majority of them are. In 
much more than nine cases out of ten the only objectively 
truthful criticism would be “This book is worthless”, while 
the truth about the reviewer’s own reaction would probably 
be “This book does not interest me in any way, and I would 
not write about it unless I were paid to.” But the public will 
not pay to read that kind of thing. Why should they? They 
want some kind of guide to the books they are asked to read, 
and they want some kind of evaluation. But as soon as 
values are mentioned, standards collapse. For if one says—
and nearly every reviewer says this kind of thing at least 
once a week—that KING LEAR is a good play and THE 
FOUR JUST MEN is a good thriller, what meaning is there 
in the word “good”?  
—George Orwell, Confessions of a Book Reviewer1 
 
One of the curiosities of modern American constitutional 
law is that it is possible to take many of its most famous 
pronouncements, and re-write them to say exactly the opposite 
thing, with no subsequent loss of cogency or plausibility. 
Take this strikingly oracular utterance authored (more or 
less) by Justice Anthony Kennedy: 
Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.2 
That certainly sounds impressive, and even definitive, as 
 
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law.  
 1. George Orwell, Confessions of a Book Reviewer, http://www.george-
orwell.org/Confessions_of_a_Book_Reviewer/0.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/46CZ-VD9R]. 
 2. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 503 U.S. 833, 844 (1992). 
13. 88.2 CAMPOS_FINAL (REVISED) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/22/2017  8:11 PM 
378 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
phrased. Still, a certain awkwardness arises if we re-phrase 
the matter: 
Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of dogmatism. 
That sounds just as good, if not better, than the canonical 
version now entombed in the United States Reports. 
This particular game can be played with many of the 
Supreme Court’s most celebrated opinions. For example, here 
is Justice Kennedy on why the Due Process Clause and the 
Equal Protection Clause make it unconstitutional to restrict 
marriage to heterosexual, at least putatively monogamous 
couples: 
The Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach.3 
That phrase is designed to elicit a certain warm fuzziness 
in the reader, which can be produced as long as one does not 
make the mistake of focusing on what is being asserted.  
Because after all: 
The Constitution does not promise liberty to all within its 
reach. 
And so on. 
Robert Nagel has spent more than forty years chronicling 
similar absurdities, and he has done so with relentless 
analytical rigor and sardonic wit. This rhetorical combination 
can often make a reader smile, as long as he himself is not the 
target of the critique, and perhaps even sometimes when he is.4 
Nagel is the American legal academy’s foremost 
practitioner of what can be called “culturally conservative 
critical legal studies.” That is to say, he has deployed both the 
intellectual methods and the contrarian sensibilities of critical 
legal studies—an intellectual movement that, when it was still 
a going concern, defined itself in self-consciously leftist terms— 
to critique constitutional law doctrine from a culturally 
 
 3. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015). 
 4. For example, I don’t think it is too much to hope that the essay linked 
below elicited at least a rueful chuckle or three from both Robert Bork and Ronald 
Dworkin: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4682& 
context=uclrev [https://perma.cc/P4N3-Y7FH]. 
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conservative perspective. 
He has done this necessary and important task brilliantly, 
and the study of American constitutional law has been 
enriched in many ways by his work. 
Now, in the spirit of Nagel’s work, I want to raise another 
awkward question: Is the kind of critique Nagel, and other 
critically-minded students of the American legal system, 
provide, something that law students should be paying for, and, 
if so, how much should they be paying to support such work?  
(It should be unnecessary to add that this same question in 
turn applies with, if anything, even more force to meta-
critiques such as this one.) 
To put it another way, is there a certain irony to requiring 
law students to so heavily subsidize the production of academic 
texts whose primary purpose is to critique the intellectual 
absurdity of so much of the material those students are 
required to study? 
I want to suggest that this is a much more difficult 
question than the legal academy acknowledges. To be more 
precise, far from being difficult, this question is simply 
invisible to most legal academics, who consider the fact that 
their students are paying for the production of legal 
scholarship to be so non-problematic that they generally forget 
that they are doing so. 
Yet to answer these questions cogently, we must first 
establish what is being subsidized, and at what cost. In a 
recent article, Jeff Harrison and Amy Mashburn estimate that 
American law school professors are now publishing about 8,000 
law review articles per year, and that the average cost of 
production for each of these articles is around $30,000.5  Their 
(very conservative) estimate yields the conclusion that law 
review article production costs $240 million per year. But 
where is the money for all this coming from? 
Most law schools draw the vast majority of their operating 
revenue from student tuition, which means that law students—
and to an increasing extent federal taxpayers—are paying to 
 
 5. Jeffery L. Harrison & Amy R. Mashburn, Citations, Justifications, and the 
Troubled State of Legal Scholarship: An Empirical Study, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 45, 
84 (2015). Their estimate is conservative because they are using conservative 
figures for both law faculty compensation, and for how much of their employment 
time law faculty spend on producing scholarship. 
13. 88.2 CAMPOS_FINAL (REVISED) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/22/2017  8:11 PM 
380 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
produce this rather frightening torrent of texts.6 Over the past 
few decades, the pace of law review article production has 
increased markedly, both because law school faculties are 
much larger now (faculty-student ratios fell by half between 
1978 and 2013), and because faculty members now produce 
much more scholarship per capita.7 
The cost of law school attendance has also markedly 
increased. The following series of figures captures, in constant, 
inflation-adjusted dollars, just how much tuition has risen at 
ABA-approved law schools over the past couple of generations, 




 1973: $13,906 
 1983: $20,280 
 1993: $30,905 
 2003: $42,292 
 2013: $54,974 
2016: $63,2688 
 
However, Harvard’s tuition has tended to be about 20% to 
25% higher than average private law school tuition, which, 








 6. Frank H. Wu, Reforming Law Schools: A Manifesto, 46 U. TOL. L. REV. 
417, 445 (2015). 
 7. Faculty-student ratios fell from about 27 to 1 to about 13.5 to 1 between 
1978 and 2013.  See Statistics, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE 
BAR, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/statistics.html  
[https://perma.cc/A275-7Q4E] (last visited Aug. 29, 2016). I estimate that the per 
capita law review publication totals of law faculty roughly tripled between 1970 
and 2012, based on the relationship between total law review publications and 
total faculty. 
 8. Tuition and fee totals are taken from annual editions of the Harvard Law 
School Catalog. HARV. L. SCH. CATALOGS (1953–2006), http://hls.harvard.edu/ 
library/digital-collections-and-exhibitions/harvard-law-school-catalogs/ 
[https://perma.cc/8BBR-RZ2E]. Inflation adjustments are based on the federal 
government’s Consumer Price Index. 
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2015: $45,4679 
 
Over the past forty years, average public law school 
resident tuition has risen at an even faster rate than private 
school tuition, climbing from $3,438 in 1974 (in 2014 dollars) to 
$24,946 in 2014.10 
A central justification for the extraordinary increase in law 
school tuition is that it was necessary to finance greatly 
expanded faculties, whose members would enjoy lower teaching 
loads, summer research stipends, sabbaticals, research leaves, 
increased travel budgets, and other incentives to produce more, 
and hypothetically, better scholarship.11 
It’s clear that this revenue explosion has helped produce 
more legal scholarship as the number of law review articles 
being published annually roughly quadrupled over the past 
four decades.12 
Has it all been worth it? No, at least not by any 
conceivably plausible metric of cost-benefit analysis. However, 
individual judgments will surely differ. 
Defenders of the proposition argue that a ten-fold increase 
in tuition is justified because of the explosion of legal 
scholarship that it has produced. However, they invariably 
focus on only a tiny slice of that literature—the part of it that 
has arguably had some lasting intellectual or practical value. 
Professor Nagel’s work belongs to this exceedingly rare 
sub-genre of legal scholarship. The problem, of course, is 
precisely that it is so rare. If the typical law review article bore 
any qualitative resemblance to Nagel’s work, then the question 
of whether it is justifiable to charge law students between four 
 
 9. Average private law school tuition has been derived from the following 
sources: for 1956, SPECIAL COMM. ON L. SCH. ADMIN. AND UNIV. RELATIONS, ASS’N 
OF AM. LAW SCHS., ANATOMY OF MODERN LEGAL EDUCATION 91 (1961); for 1974, 
John R. Kramer, Will Legal Education Remain Affordable, By Whom and How?, 
1987 DUKE L.J. 240, 241–43 (1987); for 1985 through 2005, SECTION OF LEGAL 
EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, supra note 7; and for 2015 from the author’s 
calculations, based on Form 509 disclosure documents. 
 10. For 1974 figures, see Kramer, supra note 9, at 242–43; and for 2014 
figures, see Matt Leichter, Law School Cost Data (1996–), THE LAST GEN X AM., 
https://lawschooltuitionbubble.wordpress.com/original-research-updated/the-lstb-
data/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2016) [https://perma.cc/9595-CHX6]. 
 11. See Paul Campos, The Crisis of the American Law School, 46 U. MICH. J. 
L. REFORM 177, 187–91 (2012). 
 12. Author’s calculation, based on quantitative survey of annual law review 
bibliographies. 
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(at private schools) and eight (at public schools) times more to 
attend law school than it cost when Nagel joined the legal 
academy would be difficult and interesting. But it doesn’t, and 
it isn’t. 
The overwhelming majority of legal scholarship has no 
intellectual or practical value. Rather, most of it goes unread 
and uncited by anyone beyond the author and at most a 
handful of his or her professional colleagues. It is completely 
forgotten by everyone immediately after publication, if not 
before. 
Given the conditions under which such scholarship is 
produced, this is hardly a surprise. As I have pointed out 
elsewhere: 
Recall philosophy professor Harry Frankfurt’s dictum: 
Bullshit is unavoidable whenever circumstances require 
someone to talk without knowing what he is talking about. 
The “Socratic method” consists largely of people pretending 
to be lawyers analyzing texts written (well not actually 
written, but at least signed) by lawyers pretending to be 
historians, economists, sociologists, semioticians, moral 
philosophers, etc. In other words, these are almost ideally 
synergistic conditions for the production of bullshit 
masquerading as something else (a redundancy is by 
definition something pretending to be something it is not). 
 
Legal scholarship is produced under pseudo-academic 
conditions that form a fertile breeding ground for very 
heavily footnoted bullshit. Consider how legal academic 
publication almost always takes place. People who generally 
possess no formal academic training beyond what they 
received in law school (that is, none) write “law review 
articles.” In the vast majority of cases, these articles consist 
of “doctrinal analysis,” i.e., treating appellate court opinions 
as texts that deserve to be taken seriously on their own 
terms. We are already, in other words, knee-deep in 
bullshit. 
 
But it gets worse. Who is doing the evaluating of the 
supposed cogency of this analysis? Law students, that’s who. 
So people who, incredibly enough, are even more ignorant 
than law professors about the actual legal system 
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are  charged with undertaking the equivalent of academic 
peer review for the purposes of legal scholarship . . . . 
 
Now it’s true that, at our more exalted law schools, larger 
and larger percentages of the faculty are people with 
advanced degrees in fields other than law (a solid third of 
the tenure-track faculty at top ten law schools now hold 
Ph.Ds in this or that.) While this may improve the quality 
and broaden the subject matter of the legal scholarship 
produced by these faculties, it only exacerbates the sheer 
absurdity of constructive, or literal, (there are now several 
dozen law professors at top ten schools who don’t hold law 
degrees) non-lawyers supposedly teaching people how to be 
lawyers, especially in a publication system in which law 
students are supposed to be the academic gatekeepers 
evaluating the latest application of behavioral economics or 
sociological regression analysis or literary theory to the 
cases and controversies they study in their law school 
classes.13 
Beyond all this, the increasing tendency to treat higher 
education as if it were a business has created various perverse 
metrics for faculty evaluation, such as measuring 
“productivity” in terms of how much scholarship, or at least 
putative scholarship, professors publish. It should be obvious 
that publishing more, rather than less, bad scholarship is 
worse than worthless. It should also be obvious that having an 
informal, or increasingly formal, norm that every faculty 
member should publish a law review article every year makes 
about as much sense as requiring every faculty member to 
publish a novella every year. The former norm is no more likely 
to produce more good scholarship than the latter would be 
likely to produce good literature. 
To read Professor Nagel’s work is to be struck by the fact 
that he published something when he had something original 
and interesting to say. If law schools went back to something 
resembling the financial structure they maintained at the time 
Nagel entered the legal academy forty years ago, law professors 
 
 13. Paul Campos, On Bullshit and Law Schools, LAWYERS, GUNS & MONEY 
(Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.lawyersgunsmoneyblog.com/2011/12/on-bullshit-and-
law-schools [https://perma.cc/2SBJ-BMNV]. 
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would publish much less, which in turn means they would be 
somewhat more likely to publish only when they actually had 
something to say. As a consequence, what they did publish 
would then have a higher probability of being original, or 
interesting, or, occasionally, both original and interesting. 
Law school would be much cheaper, and a much higher 
percentage of legal scholarship would be worth reading. 
Win/win, as they now say in both the business schools and the 
Chancellor’s office. 
 
 
